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Introduction
The notion that debt can serve as a commitment device for managers to not waste corporate resources is central to the corporate finance literature (e.g., Jensen 1986 , Stulz 1990 , Zwiebel 1996 . In Zwiebel's (1996) framework, for example, managers voluntarily choose debt to constrain their own future empire-building in an attempt to prevent ex post control changes.
In view of this-and to the extent that debt and well-designed corporate governance structures are substitute mechanisms in mitigating agency problems-one would expect that firms with superior corporate governance have lower levels of debt. Testing this idea is challenging, however, as firm-specific corporate governance quality may be endogenous to financing policies. In this paper, we argue that a system-wide corporate governance reform, which is plausibly exogenous to the financing policies of individual firms, provides a natural experiment to overcome this endogeneity problem. 1 We exploit the 2003 passage of a new corporate governance code in the Netherlands (the "Tabaksblat Code"). Starting from fiscal year 2004, listed companies whose registered office is in the Netherlands must refer to the code in their annual reports, and indicate to what extent they have complied with a set of corporate governance principles and best practice provisions (see Section 2 for a more detailed description of the code). Our basic hypothesis is that the corporate governance reform, by enhancing the process by which managers are controlled and monitored, alleviates agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. This should reduce the value of debt as a disciplining device, and hence result in a decrease in corporate leverage.
To test this proposition, we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation approach. 2 Specifically, we explore how the leverage of Dutch firms changed after the passage of the reform, relative to a control sample of comparable firms outside the Netherlands that were not affected by the governance reform. Adopting a DID approach enables us to filter out contemporaneous influences on financing policies that cannot be attributed to the Dutch governance reform. We find that, relative to the control sample, Dutch firms significantly reduced their leverage following the passage of the reform. Our results are robust to using different leverage measures as well as an analysis of changes (i.e., first differences) in leverage. They are further robust to an industry and size matching of the treatment and control group firms.
The Dutch Corporate Governance Code
The Dutch corporate governance code (" Tabaksblat The timing of the events suggests that the code was developed and implemented within a relatively short timeframe. Similar to the swift development and implementation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the United States, the code can therefore be considered a largely unexpected and exogenous shock to the corporate governance practices of Dutch firms.
Legally, the Dutch government gave the corporate governance code a statutory basis by including a reference in the Dutch Civil Code.
The code consists of a set of corporate governance principles and best practice provisions (cf., Corporate Governance Committee 2003). The code, for example, contains provisions regarding the amount and structure of management board members' remuneration packages (e.g., a three year vesting period for stock options) and their disclosure, limits the number of supervisory board memberships of management board members, and mandates the immediate reporting of potential conflicts of interest between management board members and their respective companies. The code also asks that at least one member of the supervisory board is a financial expert, makes requirements for the independence of the members of the supervisory board and its committees, and limits the number of additional supervisory board mandates of supervisory board members. It also requests that the chairman of the supervisory board shall not be a former member of the management board of the company. Other provisions of the code refer, for example, to the rights and responsibilities of shareholders and to the auditing of financial reporting.
The code applies to listed companies whose registered office is in the Netherlands (the code does not apply to investment funds). As of fiscal year 2004, companies are required by law to comply with the code and to refer to it in a separate chapter of their annual reports. In this chapter firms need to indicate to what extent they have complied with the code's best practice provisions. If a company chooses not to comply with a best practice provision, it must report the provision and provide an explanation for non-compliance in its annual report ("complyor-explain" principle) . Survey evidence for the year 2005 suggests that the level of compliance with the code is high, in particular, among firms that belong to the AEX (largecap) and AMX (mid-cap) stock indexes (Akkermans et al. 2007 ). large-and mid-cap European stocks. From this index, we exclude financials, firms that belong to the AEX or AMX stock indexes, and firms that are incorporated in the Netherlands but do not belong to the AEX or AMX stock indexes. 4 We add the latter group of firms to the group of treatment firms. This procedure yields a treatment group of 40 firms and a control group of 206 firms.
For each sample firm, we construct several measures of financial leverage: Book Leverage (book value of short term and long term debt over book value of assets), Market Leverage (book value of short term and long term debt over market value of equity and book value of short term and long term debt), LT Debt to Assets (book value of long term debt over book value of assets), Debt to Capital (book value of short term and long term debt over book value of equity and book value of short term and long term debt), and LT Debt to Capital (book value of long term debt over book value of equity and book value of long and short term debt).
Trade-off theories of capital structure suggest that firms, when choosing their leverage ratios, trade off tax and agency benefits of debt against direct and indirect costs of financial distress (see Myers 2003 for a review of the capital structure literature). Financial distress costs tend to be lower for larger and more profitable firms and for firms with higher levels of liquidity and fewer growth opportunities. Highly profitable firms also have more taxable income to shield. Trade-off theories thus predict that firms with such characteristics should have higher leverage ratios. Likewise, firms where managerial agency problems are more pronouncede.g., firms with high free cash-flows-should have more debt in their capital structures.
To account for these possible determinants of leverage choices, we construct a number of control variables, namely Size (measured as the natural log of assets, in Euros), Growth
Opportunities (market to book value of equity), Profitability (EBITDA over assets), and Liquidity (current assets over current liabilities). We further control for Tangibility (measured as net PPE over assets), as higher levels of asset tangibility make it easier for firms to pledge collateral, which in turn enlarges their debt capacity. For example, Campello and Hackbarth (2008) , within a real options framework where investment and financing decisions are determined simultaneously, find that investment in tangible assets helps to relax financing constraints and enhance firms' credit capacity. This, in turn, allows for additional investment, relaxing financing constraints even further. An overview of the variables we use in our analysis and their definitions is provided in Table 1 . A key assumption underlying our estimation approach is that the outcome variable of the treatment firms would have followed a similar trend as the outcome variable of the control firms if the treatment firms had not been subject to the corporate governance reform. While it is difficult to directly test the validity of this assumption, a common plausibility check is to verify whether the treatment and control firms' outcome variables followed a similar trend prior to the treatment. If, for example, the treatment firms increased their leverage by significantly more than the control firms prior to the treatment, then one might expect a stronger subsequent leverage reduction for the treatment firms even in the absence of the treatment. Figure 1 , which plots the evolution of the average leverage ratios for the treatment and control firms, respectively, suggests that we can rule out this possibility. As is apparent from the figure, the leverage ratios of the treatment and control firms have been following a fairly similar trend until 2004. Subsequently, the treatment firms decreased their leverage more heavily than the control firms.
Results
Regression results are reported in Table 4 . Models (1) and (2) analysis where we use-as a proxy for net debt issues-changes (i.e., first differences) in book leverage in our difference-in-differences tests, rather than levels of leverage (model (9)).
The DID estimate again has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant.
Our regression results further suggest that firms that are larger, less profitable, and have more tangible assets have more debt in their capital structures. These results are consistent with the empirical evidence in Garvey and Hanka (1999) , John and Litov (2009), Campello and Hackbarth (2008) , and the evidence surveyed in Myers (2003) . The results concerning size and tangibility are furthermore consistent with the predictions of trade-off theories of capital structure. The coefficients on our measures of growth opportunities and liquidity are not uniform across our specifications and do not provide conclusive evidence.
As a last robustness check, we conduct a matching analysis where we match each treatment firm with a similar control firm, based on industry (Worldscope Industry Code, Field 06011) and size. The matching was done ex ante for the year 2000, i.e., before the 2003 adoption of the Dutch corporate governance code. For each match, and separately for the before and after periods, we calculate the difference between the average leverage ratio of the treatment firm and the average leverage ratio of the matched control firm. We then take averages across matches to obtain industry and size adjusted leverage measures for the before and after periods. We apply this procedure to all five leverage measures. Table 5 reports results.
Positive numbers indicate that the leverage ratio of the treatment group is higher than that of the industry and size matched control group. Across all leverage measures, we again find that the reduction in leverage after 2003 was bigger for the treatment group firms compared to the industry and size matched control group firms. The change in leverage is significant for three of the five leverage measures and marginally insignificant for the other two.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to an open discussion on the effects of corporate governance on financing policy. While some empirical studies document that a negative relationship between managerial entrenchment and the use of debt finance (e.g. Garvey and Hanka, 1999) some more recent papers suggest the opposite (Wald and Long, 2007 and John and Litov, 2009 ). The present article contributes to this debate by analyzing the effect of a recent corporate governance reform in the Netherlands on the financial leverage of Dutch firms. We find that Dutch firms significantly reduced their leverage following the passage of reform.
Our analysis is consistent with the view that corporate governance improvements reduce the value of debt as a managerial disciplining device. Our results are robust to using different leverage measures as well as an analysis of changes in leverage. They are further robust to an industry and size matching of the treatment and control group firms.
A potential concern towards our findings could be that our control firms may have also been subject to corporate governance reforms in their respective home countries. While possible, this, however, goes against finding an incremental effect of the Dutch corporate governance reform. Thus, if anything, the absolute value of the incremental decrease in leverage of the treatment firms that we document should be biased downwards, rather than upwards. 
